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Abstract: There is uncertainty as to whether collective wage bargaining impedes the 
implementation of variable pay systems or not. We argue that much of this uncertainty is due 
to neglect of differences in the institutional structure of bargaining. Using representative 
company level data for all member states of the European Union, we investigate the incidence 
of variable pay systems in general as well as different types including payment-by-results, 
performance-related pay, and team-related pay under different bargaining arrangements. We 
find that the institutional structure of collective bargaining matters: variable pay systems thrive 
under company and multi-level collective bargaining, while their implementation is hindered 
under national-level collective wage bargaining. 
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VARIABLE PAY SYSTEMS AND/OR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING? 
COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES? 
 
 
In recent decades labor market institutions have come under increasing pressure to meet 
demands for company wage flexibility, often leading to institutional reforms in many 
industrialized countries with the aim of helping companies to react rapidly and flexibly to 
changing market conditions and shocks. In particular, pay flexibility has become an increasingly 
important topic both in academia and for policy makers. In this context reforms have focused 
on both collective wage bargaining (CWB) institutions and procedures  as well as on various 
measures which allow companies to tie wage payments more closely to performance criteria, 
in particular the implementation of variable pay systems (VPS) (e.g. Marginson 2015).  
The intention of policy makers who initiated these reforms is to limit pay 
determination via CWB and to foster it via VPS in order to increase labor market flexibility and 
facilitate higher productivity and employment growth. While pay determination via CWB tends 
to focus on the regulation of base or core pay, that via VPS refers to payment schemes that link 
an employees’ wage to her individual, her team/group or the establishment’s or  company’s 
performance. Thus, the implementation of VPS is expected to enhance flexibility as pay 
determination is more closely tied to companies’ or establishments’ success. However, as the 
amount of disposable pay is limited, pay determination via CWB which focuses on base pay, 
reduces the leeway for any variable pay component and vice versa. 
Therefore, at first glance, it appears that CWB and VPS are two opposite poles 
which might even ‘threaten’ each other (Arrowsmith and Marginson 2011) as they represent 
two different forms for the determination of pay. Consequently the answer to the question of 
whether CWB and VPS are complements or substitutes initially appears to suggest the latter. 
At second glance however there is research (e.g. Nergaard et al. 2009) which suggests that by 
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examining different contextual factors such as, for example, the wider industrial relations 
systems in which companies are embedded, the relationship between CWB and VPS is more 
varied and complex than appears at first sight.  
In particular, as argued by Kalmi et al. (2012), the relationship depends on two 
main factors. First, upon the role of the predominant national CWB system and the norms and 
options for companies to deviate from the norm. Second, on the need for companies to 
compensate for any potential flexibility constraints which emanate from CWB systems. Against 
the background that the role of the predominant national CWB system and its norms have 
become weaker in recent decades, we develop our analysis on the incidence of VPS further by 
arguing that different CWB systems place different degrees of constraint on companies, and 
hence on their need to compensate for the effects. Specifically, we derive a granular 
categorization of different CWB systems and investigate if differences in CWB arrangements 
produce an effect which encourages companies to implement VPS per se as well as distinct 
types of VPS, because it allows them to compensate for any flexibility constraints. Thus we 
investigate if VPS can be considered to be a complement to CWB rather than a substitute.  
The classification of different systems of CWB which will be investigated in our 
analysis not only captures differences in the level at which CWB takes place, but also – where 
relevant - considers the integrative interaction between actors at different levels. Thus, we will 
formulate hypotheses on the relationship between CWB and VPS and base our analysis on a 
fine-grained categorization of different CWB arrangements, which we test using 
comprehensive and representative establishment level data for all European Union (EU) 
member states.  
 
Different Structures and Forms of Collective Bargaining and Variable Pay 
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It is well documented in the literature that the role, institutional structure and procedures of 
CWB differ significantly between different countries (e.g. European Commission 2014) but 
also increasingly across different sectors of the economy (e.g. Bechter et al. 2012). While some 
studies (e.g. Kalmi et al. 2012) differentiate CWB systems into three categories, i.e. centralized, 
decentralized and multi-level systems, we differentiate further, not only with respect to the 
level, but also taking into account the integrative interaction between bargaining units at 
different levels. Specifically, we will differentiate CWB at company, sector, and national level, 
which could be either exclusive (i.e. single-level bargaining) or not (multi-level bargaining). 
We also differentiate between forms of integrative interaction or coordination (i.e. governed or 
ungoverned) between actors on different levels. We will argue in the following that these 
differences matter with respect to the incidence of VPS for companies.  
The level of CWB is the ‘classical’ dimension of differentiation considered in the 
literature and is essential for investigations of any form of company flexibility (e.g. Armstrong 
et al. 1998; Del Boca et al. 1999). The literature usually distinguishes between collective 
agreements struck on a company or establishment (decentral), sector (intermediate) or national 
(central) level. The latter two levels are often subsumed as higher level CWB systems. In 
addition, the literature also differentiates multi-level CWB systems, in case collective 
agreements are struck on multiple levels simultaneously. Due to recent reforms of the 
institutional structure of CWB, multi-level CWB structures have become increasingly frequent 
in the past two decades in a number of EU countries (e.g. Boeri 2014; Brandl and Bechter 2018; 
European Commission 2014).  
However, in the case of multi-level CWB, the structure also differs with respect 
to the degree of integrative interaction between CWB units at different levels. The interaction 
can be either governed or not. We refer to a governed interaction between bargainers at different 
levels to describe any (vertical) coordination or any kind of agreement about joint action, such 
as whether company level agreements can diverge from sector agreements within a jointly 
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defined framework. In this paper, we will use and define governed and ungoverned CWB 
according to Traxler’s (1995) commonly used definition (e.g. European Commission 2014). 
For the member states of the EU in which actors at different levels exist, under this definition, 
CWB in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Slovenia is considered to be governed and in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, 
Italy,  Portugal,  Slovakia, and Spain to be ungoverned.  
There are differences between countries in the form and scope of governability. 
In some countries, the higher-level unit agrees a sectoral level base pay and defines wage 
corridors which allow some degree of flexibility for renegotiations of pay in another round of 
CWB at company and establishment level. Such types of vertically, i.e. between units at 
different levels, governed multi-level CWB systems are characteristic of Nordic countries (e.g. 
Stokke 2008). Another form of governability is that the higher level defines and sets explicit 
derogation clauses for bargaining units at the lower levels, which allows for opting out of a 
collective agreement (e.g. Traxler et al. 2001). These forms of vertically governed interaction 
can be observed in Austria and Germany where derogation from the sectoral base pay of lower 
levels is governed by defining very explicit opt-out conditions, e.g. in cases of economic 
hardship of companies (e.g. Traxler 1995). Again, these clauses aim to increase flexibility at 
company and establishment level by further agreements. In ungoverned systems, which are 
typical for Mediterranean countries, such collective bargaining units at different levels (often) 
deal independently from each other with the same subjects (e.g. Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014). 
The legal systems in these countries, e.g. in Italy and Spain, guaranteed that independent and 
autonomous collective bargaining units at different levels do not have to compete with each 
other for the right to bargain, but also ensured that independent from which unit at which level 
struck a collective agreement, (usually) the most favorable agreement for the employee side 
applies. On the one hand, these systems guaranteed a high degree of plurality and organizational 
independence in the collective interest representation, but on the other hand, also lead to 
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redundancies and even to beggar-thy-neighbor strategies of some units which were against the 
long-term mutual interests of all units (e.g. Boeri 2014; Traxler et al. 2001).  
Even though there are differences in the interaction between CWB units at 
different levels across countries, they all have in common that governed systems are 
characterized by the ability of higher level bargaining units, usually peak and central-level 
employers’ organizations and trade unions, to impose rules and options for lower level CWB, 
while ungoverned systems do not include any such rules and options. Thus, CWB systems show 
significant differences which will be hypothesized to influence the incidence of VPS.  
Apart from the level and integrative interaction between bargaining units, CWB 
also differs across countries and sectors regarding its relevance and scope, i.e. regarding CWB 
coverage. In some ‘liberal’ countries, such as the USA, UK, or Ireland, CWB covers only a 
relatively small share of the total number of employees, while in other countries, such as for 
example in ‘Nordic countries’ such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, almost all employees 
are covered by a collective agreement. Underlying these country differences are, sometimes 
substantial, within-country variations across different sectors. For example, CWB typically 
covers a higher fraction of workers in manufacturing than in service sectors (e.g. Bechter et al. 
2012). Theoretically, these differences in CWB coverage will matter for the link between CWB 
and VPS, as very different shares of employees are affected by collective agreements. 
Methodologically, these differences necessitate that the unit of analysis is at least at the 
company level or, as differences might also exist across different establishments within 
countries, at the establishment level. Given this within country variation, we refer to CWB 
structures at the individual level as CWB arrangements rather than CWB systems, which is the 
terminology usually applied to country-level institutional structures.  
There are also important differences across various types of VPS. All VPS are 
formal schemes that systematically link an employees’ pay to the performance of the employee 
or to some kind of performance indicator, for example of a team or even the whole company. 
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They can be broadly divided into three main categories (e.g. Traxler et al. 2008). The first VPS 
category consists of payment-by-results (PbR) schemes and is based on quantitative output 
criteria and measures such as piece rates, provisions, brokerages or commissions. PbR schemes 
offer the highest degree of transparency, in the sense that employee representatives have a 
relatively high degree of certainty about the relationship between employees’ actions and the 
consequences on pay. PbR schemes do not necessarily lead to a shift in control over pay 
determination away from employee representatives towards other parties, e.g. towards 
management discretion. In addition, employee representatives might see PbR schemes as 
sufficient to ensure procedural fairness. The second category of VPS consists of Performance-
related pay (PrP) schemes which usually involve a qualitative assessment of employee 
performance. This assessment is usually made by management appraisal, which gives the 
employers discretion in the determination of pay. Compared to PbR, the uncertainty for 
employee representatives about the performance criteria and evaluation is higher and 
accompanied by a potential loss of procedural and substantive influence and control over pay 
determination. Both PbR and PrP schemes have in common that they target the performance of 
individual employees. In contrast, the third category of VPS consists of team-related pay (TrP) 
which is linked to the performance of a wider group of employees, which could be either a 
working group, a sub-team, a department, a branch or, in the case of profit-sharing schemes, 
even the whole company or establishment. The influence and controllability for individual 
employees and their representatives is lowest for TrP schemes, as the performance of various 
other contextual factors as well as other group members’ matters. Many TrP schemes are also 
based on a qualitative assessment and dependent upon employers’ discretion. Furthermore, TrP 
schemes are also often unconsolidated forms of payment, e.g. only paid for one year, and 
therefore continuously dependent upon employers’ discretion.   
In the following analysis we concentrate on these three VPS categories which 
cover 98 percent of all VPS schemes in our sample, i.e. of a representative sample of companies 
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and their establishments in all member states of the EU. However, we are aware that the 
categorization of VPS into three categories is coarse and a further differentiation would enable 
deeper insights and potentially reveal further interesting relationships, especially as different 
schemes might be used in different departments and different teams within the same 
establishment. Furthermore we are unable to consider share ownership schemes in this analysis, 
which account for the remaining 2 percent of VPS in our sample. First, for theoretical reasons, 
as the nature of share ownership schemes is different to all other categories and there are 
differences in the institutional and legal context of share ownership schemes (e.g. Kalmi et al. 
2005; Pendleton 2010). Second, for empirical reasons, as the number of observations, i.e. 
establishments in which share ownership schemes can be observed, is very limited and 
concentrated in a few countries.  
 
The Relationship between Variable Pay and Collective Wage Bargaining  
 
In the following, we will investigate whether the incidence of VPS per se, as well as different 
types of VPS, is associated with different arrangements of CWB. We will argue that differences 
in the institutional and procedural structure of CWB are associated with the different needs and 
interests of actors at different levels who are involved in CWB, i.e. of trade unions and work 
councils on the one hand and employers as well as their associations on the other hand, to 
implement VPS in order to enable flexibility in pay setting at establishment level. Specifically, 
as regards differences in the incidence of VPS with respect to different CWB arrangements, we 
argue on the basis of Kalmi et al. (2012) that VPS is implemented in establishments in order to 
compensate for potential flexibility losses in cases where a higher level collective agreement 
exists. As regards differences in the incidence of different types of VPS, we will base our 
arguments on differences in the interests of actors involved in pay determination.   
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Specifically, as outlined in the introduction, the idea behind implementation of 
VPS in order to compensate for any flexibility constraints, is that higher level CWB tends to 
omit the establishment context and establishment performance. Hence, pay which is distributed 
via higher level CWB, i.e. sectoral, national and multi-level CWB, tends not only to allocate 
pay among employees relatively equally via base (or basic) pay, but also according to sectoral 
or national criteria and not according to the establishment context. Consequentially, higher level 
CWB does not (sufficiently) differentiate between employees with different levels of 
performance or other employee-specific characteristics in establishments and thus limits the 
ability of establishments to tie payment to establishment and employee-specific performance 
criteria. Consequently, the more collective agreements apply in cases of multi-level CWB, the 
more potentially constrained the establishments might be. This constraint on employee-specific 
pay setting holds even though collective agreements usually consider a differentiation in pay 
according to employee-specific characteristics via different job grades (Traxler et al. 2008).  
In contrast, in establishments where pay is determined at the establishment level, 
i.e. in the case of no or establishment or company level CWB, a fine grained and flexible pay 
determination according to establishments’ and individual employees’ performances and 
characteristics can be achieved. Thus, in establishments which do not fall under any higher level 
collective agreement, there is less or even no need to implement VPS in order to ensure 
flexibility.  
Consequently we can derive the first hypothesis (H1), that the incidence of VPS 
is higher in establishments in which pay is determined via a higher-level CWB arrangement 
including multi-level CWB, compared with establishments in which pay is determined via an 
establishment-level CWB arrangement or which do not fall under any collective agreement. 
Even though we can basically expect that the incidence of VPS is higher for any 
form of higher level CWB, we do not necessarily expect that the effect is the same for different 
CWB arrangements. Against the background that different CWB arrangements adhere to 
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different norms and regulatory features and are associated with differences in their efficacy and 
encompassment of wage setting, i.e. on their ability to influence wage setting (e.g. Brandl 2012; 
Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Traxler et al., 2001), we expect that the effect on the incidence of 
VPS varies substantially between different CWB arrangements as well. In particular, we expect 
that the effect differs between single and multi-level CWB arrangements: the more collective 
agreements apply, the more limited the ability of companies to tie wages to establishment 
specific performance criteria and the higher the need for companies to implement VPS 
becomes. Moreover, we do not expect that the effect is the same for different multi-level CWB 
arrangements, and especially not if we differentiate between governed and ungoverned multi-
level arrangements.  
Specifically, in ungoverned CWB arrangements, where CWB units at each level 
act independently from each other, each bargaining unit has an incentive to regulate pay as 
pervasively and as comprehensively as possible according to its unit context, and therefore 
impedes establishment level flexibility even more. However, this double constraining effect 
might not apply in the case of governed multi-level arrangements where there is an integrative 
interaction between bargaining units at different levels, in the sense that duplication and 
potentially even offsetting outcomes between different levels can be avoided. While the 
integrative interaction is different between countries, governed arrangements have in common 
that higher-level units define a framework agreement and leave some leeway for establishment 
specific flexibility at lower levels. In any case, if CWB takes place at the establishment level, 
the establishment context and any flexibility demands can be considered in an establishment 
level agreement (e.g. Arrowsmith and Marginson 2011; Nergaard et al. 2009; Traxler et al., 
2008). Thus, we hypothesize that the incidence of VPS is high for ungoverned CWB 
arrangements but not necessarily for governed arrangements (H2).  
 As regards the interests of actors in the implementation of VPS in general, there 
is a consensus in the literature that employers favor the implementation of VPS per se (e.g. 
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Freeman 1982). Most notably, because it enables them to tie pay flexibly to the company 
context and company ability to pay. Furthermore, employers tend to favor VPS in order to 
influence the performance and motivation of employees (e.g. Prendergast 1999). However, 
while there is evidence that VPS, in which an individual employee’s payment is determined by 
her performance has positive effects on productivity and the performance of companies, i.e. for 
PbR, there is less evidence on the positive effect of VPS if individual payment depends upon 
the discretion of the employer (as for PrP) and instead depends upon the performance of others 
(e.g. a team or the whole company) and in addition, is unconsolidated (as often for TrP) (e.g. 
Lazear 2000).  
As regards the interests in VPS by the employee side, i.e. of employee 
representatives, there is less consensus in the literature. There are a number of reasons why 
employee representatives oppose as well as favor the implementation of VPS. For example, 
employee representatives might oppose the introduction of VPS because it potentially weakens 
solidarity and unity among employees by increasing earning disparities and thus increases the 
heterogeneity of the workforce (e.g. O’Halloran 2013), which makes it difficult to organize 
employees’ collective interests. Another reason why employee representatives might be critical 
towards VPS is that they conflict with a set of work rules about payment and working conditions 
which employee representatives previously agreed with the employer side (e.g. Kruse and Blasi 
1995). Furthermore, employee representatives might oppose VPS because business risk is 
passed over to employees. In many VPS, pay depends on various factors which are out of the 
(individual) employees’ control (e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich 1992). Finally, employee 
representatives might oppose VPS because many such systems rely on employers’ discretion 
in the determination of pay.  
However, the latter two reasons why employee representatives might oppose VPS 
refer to a potential shift in the controllability over procedural and substantive pay determination 
away from employee representatives’ influence. They might not necessarily oppose types of 
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VPS which do not imply a shift in controllability. Also, employee representatives do not 
necessarily oppose all VPS schemes, particularly if they are able to influence and mitigate any 
potential adverse impacts on employees as well as make reference to procedural fairness issues 
(e.g. Marginson et al. 2008). Furthermore, VPS is a method of pay determination that enables 
employee representatives to participate in the distribution of company’s profits in a flexible 
way in addition to other forms, e.g. in addition to base pay that is determined in collective 
bargaining. This (additional) form of flexible pay determination is especially favorable for 
employees and their representatives if the company performs well and profits can be distributed 
instantly, as well as if the process of pay determination is transparent with respect to the 
company’s targets, goals and what the implications are for the behavior of individual employees 
(e.g. Arrowsmith et al. 2008). Furthermore, if pay is distributed in a sustainable way and is not 
unconsolidated as for many profit-sharing schemes and therefore is continuously dependent 
upon the discretion of the employer side, there is little or no reason to expect the employee side 
to object (e.g. Kessler and Purcell 2003). This means that there are various reasons why the 
employer and employee side favor and/or oppose VPS, depending on the type of VPS.  
While employee representatives tend to oppose types of VPS which rely on 
employers’ discretion in the evaluation and determination of pay and limit employee 
representatives’ controllability over the distribution of pay, i.e. of PrP and TrP, this might not 
be the case for types of VPS which are based on piece rates, provisions, brokerages or 
commissions, where variable pay depends on easily measured outputs, i.e. for PbR (e.g. 
Freeman 1982). Thus, employee representatives’ interests regarding the implementation of VPS 
can be expected to vary between different types of VPS. In fact, as the literature points out, 
employee representatives are also often actively involved in the implementation of different 
types of VPS (e.g. Arrowsmith et al. 2010; Bryson et al. 2011). 
The previous reasoning on different interests in the implementation of different 
types of VPS implies that employee representatives favor types of VPS where they maintain 
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some control over pay determination, such as in particular PbR, rather than types such as TrP 
where they have less control. At the same time, employers might hold the opposite view and 
favor VPS such as TrP that allow them greater discretionary leeway, particularly as this might  
favor them in a changing economic environment. The type of VPS implemented in a specific 
firm then depends on the relative assertiveness of both parties. In terms of CWB arrangements, 
it stands to reason that more encompassing systems of CWB, i.e. those that cover establishments 
in whole sectors or the whole country and therefore include establishments in which the 
employee side is weak (e.g. Traxler et al. 2001), increase the assertiveness of the employee 
side. Thus we hypothesize (H3) that the incidence of types of VPS which are comparatively 
favored more by the employee side, such as in particular PbR, is higher under more 
encompassing CWB arrangements such as under sectoral, national and multi-level CWB 
arrangements, while the incidence of types of VPS favoring the employer side, such as TrP is 
relatively lower. We further expect that the incidence of PrP ranks in-between. In the following 
we test the above hypotheses in a multiple regression framework using establishment level data 
for all EU member states. 
 
Data and Empirical Background 
 
Our data source is the 2013 wave of the European Company Survey (ECS), see Eurofound 
(2015). This data is collected at the establishment level and is based on interviews with 
managers and employee representatives. The ECS was collected in spring 2013 across all 
current 28 EU member states. This data allows us to test our hypotheses on a comprehensive 
sample of different companies and establishments which are embedded in very different 
arrangements of CWB. Also, the data from the ECS is based on a standardized survey which 
allows a comparison across sectors and countries. Furthermore and against the background that 
there is a significant within-country, sector and even establishment variation in CWB and VPS, 
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the establishment level data of the ECS permits the identification and exact analysis of the 
situation pertaining to an individual establishment. Thus the data provides a more precise 
indication of the relationship between CWB and VPS than would be possible from national and 
sectoral studies.  
The data is representative for businesses and organizations with 10 or more 
employees and includes both privately and publicly (i.e. if public authorities own more than 
50%) owned companies. The sample size for our estimation sample consists of 18,500 
establishments. Most importantly for our research question, the ECS contains detailed 
information about the CWB arrangement which applies, as well as about different VPS which 
exist in the establishments. Furthermore the ECS contains detail on various other industrial 
relations indicators which are relevant. In addition we combine establishment-level information 
from the ECS with information on characteristics of national CWB, i.e. on the governability of 
CWB if establishments are covered by a collective agreement, from Aumayr-Pintar et al. 
(2014).  
In the following analysis we will investigate the incidence of the three different 
types of VPS schemes, i.e. of payment-by-results (PbR), performance-related pay (PrP) and of 
team-related pay (TrP), as well as on the incidence of any VPS along the different CWB 
arrangements. Regarding CWB we focus on two key dimensions of CWB arrangements: the 
level of bargaining and the degree of integrative interaction between CWB units at different 
levels, i.e. whether the interaction is vertically governed or not. This means that we are able to 
augment previous literature, i.e. Kalmi et al. (2012), with respect to the range and validity of 
the argument as well as with respect to the granularity of the CWB arrangement and different 
types of VPS. As regards the range and validity of the argument, we investigate if the 
relationships between CWB and VPS hold independently of the predominant norm. In terms of 
the granularity, we are able to differentiate further than Kalmi et al. (2012), both in terms of the 
different levels at which CWB takes place (i.e. for all our hypotheses) as well as between 
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different types of VPS (i.e. in H3), where we can differentiate between PbR and PrP rather than 
combining them as individual performance-based pay. Also, we consider (in H2) the integrative 
interaction between actors in CWB as a relevant factor that is able to explain differences in the 
incidence of VPS in establishments. Furthermore, our data base is considerably larger which 
allows us to test models in our analysis which consider and control for a wide range of 
contextual factors. 
In the discussion and in our categorization of collective bargaining levels, we refer 
to the term ‘company-level bargaining’, which is common in the literature to denote all single 
employer bargaining arrangements, but in all places when we refer to the ECS and the results, 
we refer to the term ‘establishment’ which is the exact unit of analysis of the ECS. Table 1 
gives a descriptive overview of the incidence of VPS along the different arrangements of CWB. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
As we can see, the majority of establishments across all CWB arrangements, have 
implemented some form of VPS. It can also be seen that it is common practice to make use of 
a mix of VPS, i.e. to have different types of VPS implemented simultaneously, which is 
consistent with previous studies (e.g. Pendleton and Robinson 2017). However, the incidence 
varies from 60 percent of all establishments (national bargaining) to 76 percent (company or 
establishment bargaining). The least common type of VPS over all CWB arrangements is 
consistently PbR, while both PrP and TrP is more frequently implemented in companies. Some 
of the patterns observed in Table 1 are in line with our hypotheses derived in the previous 
section. For example, the incidence of VPS is higher in firms with multi-level bargaining than 
in all other single-level arrangements.  
However, the comparisons in Table 1 are unconditional differences which do not 
control for any contextual factors such as country, sector, or establishment differences which 
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were mentioned earlier that affect the relationship between CWB and VPS. The following 
section considers these patterns in a regression framework that controls for the effects of a range 
of potential confounders. Table 1A in the appendix presents the means of all control variables 
used in the analyses. A correlation matrix for all variables can be found in the online appendix. 
 
Modelling Strategy and Results 
 
Against the background that the literature reports convincing evidence that contextual factors 
matter for the incidence of VPS (e.g. Brown and Heywood 2005; Gunnigle et al. 1998; Machin 
and Wood 2005; Pendleton et al. 2009), any generalizable answer to the question of whether 
CWB and VPS are complements or substitutes can only be found by taking contextual factors 
into account. Therefore we include in our specification a number of control variables which can 
be grouped into five categories. 
The first category of variables control for industrial relations factors other than 
the structure of CWB, such as the presence of works councils and union representatives in the 
establishment, in order to control for institutional and procedural differences of establishment 
level employee representation as well as whether or not the company is a member of an 
employers’ organization (e.g. Heywood et al. 1998). We do this as a proxy to control if 
agreements are extended to the establishment even though the establishment is not directly 
involved in collective bargaining via its membership in an employer organization (e.g. Traxler 
et al. 2001). The second category of variables control for differences between firms that 
potentially influence the incidence of VPS, such as establishment size, whether the firm is a 
headquarters or a subsidiary site, and in which sector the firm is placed. We do this as 
differences in sectors potentially also imply differences in the incidence of VPS, not only 
because of potentially different sector CWB traditions, but also because of various economic 
differences between sectors (e.g. Heywood and Jirjahn 2009; Nergaard et al. 2009). In addition, 
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we control for private or public ownership of the establishment, as the literature has documented 
differences in the incidence of VPS in the private and public sector (e.g. Marsden and Belfield 
2010). The third category of variables control for employment characteristics and include the 
percentage shares (in categories) of employees with open ended contracts, who are women, are 
older than 50, hold a university degree, and work part-time. Although some of these factors are 
also captured by firm characteristics, they broaden the previous control variables by a further 
differentiation between different interests of the employee force in VPS (e.g. Jirjahn and 
Poutsma 2013; Kruse 1996). The fourth category of variables control for the presence of 
different aspects of high involvement Human Resource (HR) practices and include: whether 
planning and execution of daily tasks is decided by managers or supervisors or both, whether 
job rotation can be found and how it relates to skills and training needs and training activities 
of employees (e.g. Pérotin and Robinson 2003). Given that the incidence of VPS also depends 
on the financial ability of establishments to afford extra payments (e.g. Blinder 1990) we also 
control, in a fifth category with establishment business variables, for factors which reflect the 
financial situation. Against the background that the interests of both the employee and the 
employer side in the implementation of VPS depends on the financial situation of the 
establishment, the inclusion of these control variables is needed. In addition, in all models we 
introduce country fixed effects in order to control fully for any eventual country variation. All 
effects for our focal variables that are reported in the following tables and discussed in the 
following analyses also hold in more parsimonious models that exclude most control variables.  
Some of our variables which refer to institutional characteristics of industries and 
countries, such as for example CWB at the national level, vary at a higher aggregation level 
than the establishment level. This potentially leads to an overstatement of the precision of the 
estimates (Moulton 1986). Given the relatively low number of countries, simply adjusting the 
estimated standard errors for clustering at the highest aggregation level of the variables of 
interest is potentially problematic. Therefore we compute standard errors in three different 
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ways, using the usual heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on the country level and a parametric correction factor for the standard errors based 
on a recommendation by Angrist and Pischke (2009). All three sets of results can be found in 
the online appendix. All lead to the same substantive conclusions. The tables in the paper use 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
In our empirical analysis we first look at the incidence of any type of VPS in 
different arrangements of CWB and start with a simple specification, (a) which only 
distinguishes between single-level and multiple-level CWB arrangements which is followed by 
(b), where three types of single-level bargaining as well as all types of multi-level bargaining 
are distinguished. The subsequent specification (c), differentiates further by splitting multi-
level bargaining into governed and ungoverned arrangements in order to investigate the role of 
an integrative interaction between different levels of CWB. Our omitted base category is 
establishments not covered by any collective agreement. However, as for any categorization, 
that between governed and ungoverned CWB arrangements is not always clear, e.g. for Italy, 
and there is some degree of uncertainty whether the classification is adequate. To test the 
robustness of our results to such uncertainty, we re-estimate our models omitting all 
observations from each country in turn. The tests which are available upon request show that 
our results are robust to any reclassification and therefore we only show in Table 2 those that 
reflect the operationalizations and classifications discussed earlier. Furthermore, for reasons of 
space, in Table 2 we only report the results of our key variables of interest: the estimation results 
of the control variable in Table 2A are shown in the appendix. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Regarding the focal independent variables, Table 2 shows that the incidence of 
VPS varies across different arrangements of CWB. In model (a) we see from the coefficient for 
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multi-level bargaining that the incidence of VPS is considerably and significantly higher in 
establishments which fall under collective agreements that originate from multi-level CWB 
compared with establishments in which CWB is absent. We also see that the incidence of VPS 
is not significantly different in establishments which are covered by collective agreements that 
originate from single-level CWB. In model (b), single-level CWB arrangements are 
differentiated according to the level at which bargaining takes place and it can be seen that the 
incidence of VPS in establishments which are covered by a company and sector level agreement 
is not different to establishments without any collective agreement. We also see that the 
incidence in VPS is lower in establishments which are covered by a national collective 
agreement compared to establishments which are not covered by any agreement at all.  
The latter result is in line with research by Kalmi et al. (2012) that in some 
centralized CWB arrangements which include the national level, institutional norms and 
regulatory features of the CWB arrangement and also the CWB system itself can have an 
inhibiting effect on the implementation of VPS. The implication of the results shown in (a) and 
(b) for our first hypothesis (H1), i.e. the incidence of VPS is higher in establishments in which 
pay is determined via any CWB arrangement compared to establishments without any 
collective agreement, is that it can only be conditionally accepted, as it holds for multi-level but 
not for single-level CWB arrangements. For single-level CWB arrangements, the hypothesis 
must be rejected as the incidence of VPS for company and sector level CWB is similar to no 
CWB at all. Moreover, for national CWB the incidence is even negative. The latter result might 
be explained by the fact that the nature and topics covered in national level CWB differ both to 
VPS and pay flexibility. As regards estimation results in model (c) in which multi-level 
arrangements are split into governed and ungoverned arrangements, we see that in ungoverned 
arrangements the incidence of VPS is significantly higher, while in governed arrangements the 
incidence does not differ in comparison to the incidence of VPS in establishments without any 
collective agreement. This implies that we can fully accept our second hypothesis (H2), i.e. the 
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incidence of VPS is higher for ungoverned CWB arrangements but not necessarily for governed 
arrangements.  
Table 2A in the appendix shows the estimated coefficients for all control 
variables, ranging from firm, business, industrial relations, employment, and HR practices, as 
suggested in the literature and discussed before. As can be seen, many of the control factors are 
able to explain substantial differences in the incidence of VPS. Without being able to discuss 
the estimation results of all control variables in detail we will focus in the following on the 
industrial relations characteristics but would like to emphasize that the estimates of all other 
control variables are generally in line with relevant literature.  
As regards the role of industrial relations factors, we see that if the establishment 
is a member of an employers’ organization, the incidence of VPS is significantly higher. As 
membership in an employers’ organization was argued to be an indicator for the involvement 
of establishments in collective bargaining, or at least to have same say in the collective 
bargaining process and outcome, this positive relationship between membership of an 
employers’ organization and the incidence of VPS suggests that if establishments are collective 
bargaining makers rather than takers, they more actively implement VPS. Furthermore, we also 
see that if a works council exists in the establishment, the incidence of VPS is significantly 
higher. However, as regards the presence of a trade union representative in the establishment, 
the incidence for VPS is significantly lower than in the case of its absence. On the one hand, 
the result that different types of representatives of the employee side at establishment level have 
different, i.e. opposite, effects on the incidence of VPS confirms literature which underlines 
that no universal relationship exists (e.g. Barth et al. 2008). On the other hand, it also points 
towards the need for a more differentiated analysis with respect to the interaction of different 
types of employee representatives with the wider industrial relations system. As regards the 
need for a more differentiated analysis of different types of employee representatives on the 
incidence of VPS, there is clear evidence in the literature that the industrial relations framework 
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clearly matters. For example Arrowsmith et al. (2010) show that in some countries, e.g. Austria, 
works councils are (legally) equipped with the right to negotiate the implementation of VPS if 
supported by a higher-level collective agreement, while in others countries, e.g. Spain, this right 
is not only opaque but also dependent upon wider trade union support. Furthermore, as shown 
for example by Nergaard et al. (2009), the role of different types of employee representatives 
with respect to the implementation of VPS also depends on how governed the interaction 
between the company and higher level of collective bargaining is, as well as if (or not) VPS is 
already an integral part of a higher-level collective agreement. Such a detailed analysis on the 
role of different types of employee representatives would go beyond the scope of this analysis 
which concentrates on the role of the CWB arrangement. In any case, this implies for the 
interpretation of the estimates of our control variables that any inferences on the role of works 
councils and trade unions per se should be made with much caution, as a differentiated analysis 
between different types of works councils and the role of trade unions in different countries, as 
well as in interaction between trade unions at different levels, would be needed in order to be 
able to draw reliable conclusions.  
We also hypothesized in H3 that the incidence of VPS will vary regarding 
different types of VPS. In the following discussion we concentrate on the association between 
different CWB arrangements and the relative incidence of each type of VPS. Table 3 shows the 
estimation results which are based on the same specifications as in Table 2. For reasons of 
space, we do not show estimation results for the control variables but focus on the focal 
independent variables. We also concentrate on the three different types of VPS alone rather 
than combinations of them. As we are particularly interested in the question of whether the 
associations between CWB arrangements and the incidence of VPS differs across the three 
types, we formally test the equality of coefficients across the three equations in a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SURE) framework (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 2010). As will be discussed 
in more detail below, we cannot reject the Null of equal effects across outcomes for PbR and 
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PrP, but find statistically significant differences in effects between PbR on the one hand and 
TrP on the other. Specifically, the effects of national CWB and governed multi-level CWB are 
statistically different at the conventional levels of significance (i.e. up to a 10 % significance 
level). This result supports our conjecture that different interests of employers and employees 
might lead to differences in the relative incidence of the polar cases of VPS, i.e, PbR on the one 
extreme and TrP on the other. Furthermore, we also estimated a trivariate Probit, where we 
allowed the unobservables across the three outcome equations in Table 3 to be correlated. The 
results lead to the same substantive conclusions and are in the online appendix. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
By examining the coefficients which are significant in Table 3 and by comparing 
them with the coefficients of the same category of CWB in Table 2, it is apparent that the 
relationships between CWB arrangements and PbR and PrP are very similar to those found in 
Table 2 for any VPS. The only difference is that the coefficients for national level bargaining 
are no longer consistently significant for both PbR and PrP. For PrP, we also find less of a 
difference between the effects of governed and ungoverned multi-level CWB than for PbR and 
in Table 2.  
For TrP however the picture is slightly different. In line with H3, we find more 
strongly negative links between more encompassing (higher-level) CWB arrangements. This 
finding is also supported by the formal tests of equality of coefficients across the 3 models, 
which shows statistically significant differences in the models for TrP on the one hand and PbR 
and PrP on the other. These results suggest that types of VPS which are characterized by a 
relatively high degree of employee side control over pay determination, i.e. PbR, are more 
commonly implemented in establishments compared with TrP in which employees and their 
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representatives have relatively little control over pay determination and are dependent upon 
continuous employers’ discretion.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
In this paper we have analyzed differences in the incidence of VPS per se as well as for different 
types of VPS in establishments dependent on the institutional structure and the procedures of 
the CWB arrangements in which they are embedded. Our analysis and hypothesis tests, which 
were conducted on the basis of comprehensive and representative establishment level data from 
all EU member states, showed that companies are actively using VPS to compensate for 
possible flexibility constraints which emanate from different CWB arrangements. Specifically, 
we were able to show that in multi-level CWB arrangements the incidence of VPS is higher 
compared to single-level CWB arrangements (as well as in the absence of any CWB). 
Moreover, amongst multi-level arrangements, ungoverned arrangements were associated with 
a higher incidence of VPS as compared to those with governed arrangements (and also single-
level arrangements). The distinction between ungoverned and governed arrangements has not 
previously been investigated in a quantitative analysis. Since we expected ungoverned multi-
level arrangements to constrain establishments’ flexibility, this result confirmed our hypotheses 
that VPS is implemented in such arrangements to compensate for any flexibility loss due to one 
or more collective agreements which apply. Furthermore, we were able to augment and 
generalize results and reasoning from previous studies on the relationship between CWB 
systems and different types of VPS (e.g. Kalmi et al. 2012) since we showed that (nowadays) 
the effect of CWB arrangements  on the incidence of VPS per se as well as with respect to 
different types of VPS, holds independent of the predominant norm and level of the national 
CWB system in which establishments are embedded.  
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The result of our analysis, that VPS is common in multi-level CWB arrangements 
is of particular interest for two reasons. First, because multi-level arrangements are becoming 
increasingly common in all EU member states due to recent institutional reforms (e.g. Brandl 
and Bechter 2018) and therefore their efficacy regarding their ability to guarantee wage 
flexibility needs to be clarified. Second, because multi-level CWB arrangements were 
sometimes critically portrayed in terms of their ability to enable wage flexibility (e.g. Boeri 
2014; OECD 2018). Against this background our result that multi-level CWB, so long as 
relations between levels are governed, and VPS are compatible is of particular relevance.  
These results also exemplify the advantages of analyzing a comprehensive 
country sample which allowed us to carry out a fine grained analysis with generalizable results. 
Future research could make further distinctions as the ECS did not allow us to differentiate 
within establishments between different groups of workers. Nevertheless, our results provide 
solid, systematic and comprehensive evidence on the efficacy of labor market institutions such 
as CWB institutions which could inform public policy debates. The analysis here contributes 
to and continues both old academic debates about the role and effects of different labor market 
institutions as well as on necessary reforms (e.g. Blanchard 2006) as well as to policy oriented 
debates by national and international policy makers such as the Organization for Economic and 
Co-operation Development (OECD), European Commission (EC) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) which all stress that institutional reforms should increase wage flexibility (e.g. 
Arpaia and Mourre 2009; Blanchard et al. 2014; OECD 2018). More precisely, the results here 
are directly relevant for current attempts to reform CWB arrangements in Europe in order to 
enable companies to react quickly to changing market conditions and shocks in a variable and 
flexible way (e.g. Heyes 2013, Lewis 2009). For this reason, the EC encouraged national policy 
makers to reform CWB systems to enable companies to vary the demand for labor as well as to 
tighten links between employee payment and performance criteria by fostering the 
implementation of VPS (e.g. European Commission 2009). The results here show that in 
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establishments in which collective agreements are struck at multiple levels, the incidence of 
VPS is even higher than in companies in which employees are covered by no collective 
agreement at all.    
The bottom line however is that our analysis clearly shows that VPS and CWB 
are not contradictory, but compatible, even though the relationship is dependent not only on the 
type of VPS but fundamentally on the underlying institutional structures and procedures of the 
CWB arrangement or system.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Percentage of 
companies 
Percentage of companies with 
 Any variable 
pay system 
Payment by results 
(PbR) 
Performance-related 
pay (PrP) 
Team-related 
pay (TrP) 
No collective bargaining 38 72 42 52 50 
Single-level bargaining 42 70 38 49 50 
   Only company bargaining 18 76 41 55 56 
   Only sectoral bargaining 15 69 40 47 49 
   Only national bargaining 10 60 28 42 40 
Multi-level arrangements      
   Multi-level bargaining 20 75 44 55 56 
      Governed multi-level bargaining 7 78 45 59 58 
      Ungoverned multi-level bargaining 13 73 43 53 55 
Observations 18,524 
Note: The figures on the incidence of VPS are based on the question to (human resource) managers in establishments: “Now I am going to read out certain variable payment options on top of basic 
pay that might be in place in your establishment. Could you please tell me for each of these options, whether or not they are available to at least some employees?”. The options given were: “Payment 
by results, for example piece rates, provisions, brokerages or commissions”, “Variable extra pay linked to the individual performance following management appraisal”, “Variable extra pay linked to 
the performance of the team, working group or department”, “Variable extra pay linked to the results of the company or establishment (profit sharing scheme)”. The latter two categories were collapsed 
in the analyses as they are capturing the non-individual performance. The answer categories were: “Yes”, “No”, “Don’t know”, and “No answer”. The information on the incidence of the CWB level 
in establishments are analogously based on the question “Are employees in this establishment covered by any of the following collective wage agreements?”. The following agreements/options were 
given: “A collective wage agreement negotiated at the establishment or company level”, ”A collective wage agreement negotiated at the sectoral or regional level”, ”A national cross-sectoral collective 
wage agreement”. The answer categories were: “Yes”, “No”, “Don’t know”, and “No answer”. Observations with replied “Don’t know” and “No answer” are generally dropped from the estimation 
sample. Information on the governability of CWB is based on Aumayr-Pintar et al. (2014).  
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Table 2. Collective Wage Bargaining and the Incidence of Variable Pay Systems 
 Models 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Differentiation between levels:    
Single-level bargaining -0.001   
 (0.008)   
Only company bargaining  0.015 0.016 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Only sectoral bargaining  -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
Only national bargaining  -0.034*** -0.032** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Multi-level bargaining 0.033*** 0.028***  
 (0.010) (0.010)  
Differentiation in governability:    
Governed multi-level bargaining   -0.003 
   (0.016) 
Ungoverned multi-level bargaining   0.043*** 
   (0.012) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.1433 0.1439 0.1442 
Observations 18,524 18,524 18,524 
Note: Probit average marginal effects, robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10 % level, 5% level, and 1% level. All estimates control 
for country fixed effects as well as further control variables which are listed in Table 2A. Reference category for CWB is no collective bargaining. 
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Table 3. Collective Wage Bargaining and the Type of Variable Pay System 
 Models 
 (a) (b) (c)  
Differentiation between levels: Outcome: Payment by results (PbR) 
Single-level bargaining -0.010    
 (0.009)    
Only company bargaining  -0.006 -0.005  
  (0.011) (0.011)  
Only sectoral bargaining  -0.010 -0.013  
  (0.013) (0.013)  
Only national bargaining  -0.024 -0.023  
  (0.015) (0.015)  
Multi-level bargaining 0.048*** 0.047***   
 (0.012) (0.012)   
Differentiation in governability:     
Governed multi-level bargaining   0.021  
   (0.017)  
Ungoverned multi-level bargaining   0.061***  
   (0.013)  
Pseudo R2 0.0837 0.0838 0.0840  
Differentiation between levels: Outcome: Performance-related pay (PrP) 
Single-level bargaining -0.004    
 (0.009)    
Only company bargaining  0.011 0.011  
  (0.011) (0.011)  
Only sectoral bargaining  -0.019 -0.020  
  (0.013) (0.013)  
Only national bargaining  -0.025 -0.024  
  (0.015) (0.015)  
Multi-level bargaining 0.054*** 0.049***   
 (0.012) (0.012)   
Differentiation in governability:     
Governed multi-level bargaining   0.038**  
   (0.017)  
Ungoverned multi-level bargaining   0.055***  
   (0.014)  
Pseudo R2 0.0840 0.0840 0.0840  
Differentiation between levels: Outcome: Team-related pay (TrP) 
Single-level bargaining -0.016*    
 (0.009)    
Only company bargaining  0.002 0.003  
  (0.011) (0.011)  
Only sectoral bargaining  -0.027** -0.030**  
  (0.012) (0.013)  
Only national bargaining  -0.051*** -0.049***  
  (0.015) (0.015)  
Multi-level bargaining 0.030*** 0.025**   
 (0.011) (0.011)   
Differentiation in governability:     
Governed multi-level bargaining   -0.024  
   (0.017)  
Ungoverned multi-level bargaining   0.050***  
   (0.013)  
Pseudo R2 0.0943 0.0946 0.0946  
Observations 18,524 18,524 18,524  
Note: Probit average marginal effects, robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical 
significance on the 10 % level, 5 % level, and 1 % level. See notes in Table 2 which apply also here.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Mean of control variables 
Variable Mean 
Industrial relations characteristics  
   Member of an employers‘ organization 0.374 
   Union representation in company 0.265 
   Works council present 0.265 
  
Firm characteristics  
   Industry classification (Ref = Manufacturing)  
      Construction 0.085 
      Commerce and hospitality 0.241 
      Transport and communication 0.070 
      Financial services and real estate 0.044 
      Other services 0.220 
   Public sector  0.084 
Establishment size (Ref = 10-49)  
      50-249 employees 0.318 
      250+ employees 0.150 
Establishment type (Ref = Single company)  
   Headquarters of a multi-site company 0.206 
   Subsidiary site of a multi-site company 0.102 
  
Employment characteristics  
   Percentage of employees with open ended contract (categories, Ref = none)  
      Less than 20% 0.042 
      20% to 39% 0.027 
      40% to 59% 0.043 
      60% to 79% 0.087 
      80% to 99% 0.389 
      All 0.392 
   Percentage of employees who are women (categories, Ref = none)  
      Less than 20% 0.308 
      20% to 39% 0.229 
      40% to 59% 0.219 
     60% to 79% 0.135 
     80% to 99% 0.081 
     All 0.009 
   Percentage of employees older than 50 (categories, Ref = none)  
      Less than 20% 0.449 
      20% to 39% 0.304 
      40% to 59% 0.133 
      60% to 79% 0.037 
      80% to 99% 0.009 
     All 0.001 
   Percentage of employees with university degrees (categories, Ref = none)  
      Less than 20% 0.480 
      20% to 39% 0.183 
      40% to 59% 0.081 
      60% to 79% 0.055 
      80% to 99% 0.057 
      All 0.017 
   Percentage of employees working part-time (categories, Ref = none)  
      Less than 20% 0.509 
      20% to 39% 0.095 
      40% to 59% 0.037 
      60% to 79% 0.026 
      80% to 99% 0.018 
      All 0.006 
  
HR practices  
   Planning and execution of daily tasks decided by (Ref = employee)  
      Managers or supervisors 0.556 
      Both employees and managers or supervisors 0.393 
   Do any employees rotate tasks with other employees? (Ref = Most do)  
      Yes, some do 0.460 
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      No, none do 0.252 
      No, the high level of required skills or expertise prevents  
      employees from rotating tasks 
0.056 
   Percentage of employees who have received on the job training  
   (categories, Ref = none) 
 
      Less than 20% 0.219 
      20% to 39% 0.159 
      40% to 59% 0.101 
      60% to 79% 0.056 
      80% to 99% 0.060 
     All 0.199 
   Percentage of employees working in jobs that require at least one    
   year of on the job learning to become proficient(categories, Ref = none) 
 
      Less than 20% 0.167 
      20% to 39% 0.119 
      40% to 59% 0.089 
      60% to 79% 0.064 
      80% to 99% 0.080 
     All 0.136 
  
Business characteristics  
Financial situation of company (Ref = very good) 0.496 
   Financial situation good 0.284 
   Financial situation neither good nor bad 0.077 
   Financial situation bad 0.014 
   Financial situation very bad 0.496 
Change in financial situation since 2010 (Ref = improved)  
   Financial situation remained about the same since 2010 0.382 
   Financial situation worsened about the same since 2010 0.314 
  
Note: Ref = Reference category. 
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Table A2. Full control variables, Table 2 
 Model 
 (a) (b) (c)  
Industrial relations characteristics     
   Member of an employers‘ organization 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.025***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
   Union representation in company -0.022** -0.025*** -0.025***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
   Works council present 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Firm characteristics     
   Construction -0.013 -0.012 -0.011  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
   Commerce and hospitality 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
   Transport and communication -0.029** -0.030** -0.030**  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
   Financial services and real estate 0.015 0.015 0.015  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
   Other services -0.012 -0.011 -0.011  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
   Public sector  -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.140***  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
   50-249 employees 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
   250+ employees 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.132***  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
   Headquarters of a multi-site company 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
   Subsidiary site of a multi-site company 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
Employment characteristics     
   Percentage of employees with open ended contract 
(categories) 
    
      Less than 20% 0.041 0.042 0.039  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
      20% to 39% 0.011 0.012 0.011  
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  
      40% to 59% 0.020 0.021 0.020  
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)  
      60% to 79% -0.004 -0.003 -0.005  
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
      80% to 99% 0.035 0.036 0.035  
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  
      All 0.010 0.011 0.010  
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  
   Percentage of employees who are women (categories)     
      Less than 20% -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
      20% to 39% 0.010 0.010 0.010  
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  
      40% to 59% -0.018 -0.018 -0.018  
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  
     60% to 79% -0.020 -0.019 -0.019  
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  
     80% to 99% -0.044* -0.044* -0.043*  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
     All -0.039 -0.041 -0.040  
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)  
   Percentage of employees older than 50 (categories)     
      Less than 20% -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
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 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
      20% to 39% -0.006 -0.006 -0.006  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
      40% to 59% -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
      60% to 79% -0.041** -0.042** -0.042**  
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)  
      80% to 99% -0.066* -0.066* -0.066*  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)  
     All 0.007 0.005 0.003  
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)  
   Percentage of employees with university degrees (categories)     
      Less than 20% 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
      20% to 39% 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.080***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
      40% to 59% 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.116***  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
      60% to 79% 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.101***  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
      80% to 99% 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.131***  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
      All 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147***  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
   Percentage of employees working part-time (categories)     
      Less than 20% 0.004 0.005 0.005  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
      20% to 39% -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035***  
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)  
      40% to 59% -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.059***  
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
      60% to 79% -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.062***  
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  
      80% to 99% -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.076***  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
      All -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.112***  
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)  
HR practices     
   Planning and execution of daily tasks decided by     
   Managers or supervisors -0.002 -0.003 -0.002  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
   Both employees and managers or supervisors 0.025* 0.024 0.025*  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
   Do any employees rotate tasks with other employees?     
      Yes, some do 0.002 0.001 0.001  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
      No, none do -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
      No, the high level of required skills or expertise prevents  
      employees from rotating tasks 
-0.026* -0.026* -0.026*  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
Percentage of employees who have received on the job 
training  
   (categories) 
    
      Less than 20% 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071***  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
      20% to 39% 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
      40% to 59% 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
      60% to 79% 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106***  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
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     80% to 99% 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123***  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
    All 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.086***  
   Percentage of employees working in jobs that require at least 
one    
   year of on the job learning to become proficient(categories) 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)  
      Less than 20% 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
      20% to 39% 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.047***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
      40% to 59% 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
      60% to 79% 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050***  
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  
      80% to 99% 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.060***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
     All 0.016 0.016 0.016  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
Business characteristics     
   Financial situation good -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032***  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
   Financial situation neither good nor bad -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
   Financial situation bad -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083***  
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
   Financial situation very bad -0.178*** -0.176*** -0.177***  
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  
   Financial situation remained about the same since 2010 -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
   Financial situation worsened about the same since 2010 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Observations 18524 18524 18524  
Note: See Table 2 for information regarding estimation details. 
 
 
 
 
